by RockyMountainNavy, 12 February 2025
In January 1951 the Korean War was six months old. The invasion of South Korea by North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea or DPRK) in June 1950 drove United Nations (UN) back to the Pusan Perimeter. In a brilliant counterstroke the UN conducted an amphibious landing at Inch’on in mid-September which collapsed the North Korean offensive. The North Korean retreat stopped only after the People’s Republic of China (PRC) entered the war in November. The entry of the PRC into the war pushed overextended UN troops back into South Korea. In late January 1951 General Ridgway, U.S. Eighth Army commander, issued a directive to move from reconnaissance operations to a deliberate counterattack. Operation THUNDERBOLT worked well, that is, until Communist forces counterattacked and threatened to push the UN forces back down the peninsula again. Morale in Eighth Army was low; the Communist Chinese forces seemed invincible and every attack seemingly saw UN forces “bugging out.” Ridgway needed to make a stand and called on the 23rd Regimental Combat Team (RCT) with the attached French Battaillon de Coree.
Come 3 February, the 23rd Regimental Combat Team (RCT) found itself assigned to defend Chipyong-ni. The unit’s orders were clear, “Dominate the road center of Chipyong-ni and occupy the high ground in the vicinity so as to protect the right flank of IX Corps and establish the western anchor of X Corps line of departure for the offensive [Operation Roundup].” (Staff Ride, p. 17)
Chipyong-ni was a key road junction surrounded by hills. The 23rd RCT commander, Colonel Paul LaMarch Freeman Jr., recognized that the 23rd RCT was outside the range of friendly artillery and beyond supporting distance from X Corps; there was an almost 12 mile gap between the 23rd RCT and the next X Corps unit to the east. Freeman believed the isolated American regimental combat team “was simply too ripe a plum for the Chinese to resist” and decided that aggressive patrolling was essential to protect his force. He wanted to know where the enemy was and what they planned to do. (Staff Ride, p. 19)
The 23rd RCT had recently been bloodied in the Battle of Twin Tunnels and technically was only 70% combat effective. Even so, morale in the 23rd was high; Ridgway saw a unit with a strong fighting spirit and confident leadership. Further, the French Battaillon de Coree was attached to the 23rd RCT. The French were led by the larger-than-life Lt. Col Ralph Monclar. A national hero, Monclar voluntarily took a demotion from three star general to Lieutenant Colonel in order to lead the battalion in Korea. (Staff Ride, p. 18)
While Freeman and the 23rd RCT conducted aggressive patrolling around Chipyong-ni, the war took a turn against the UN at the Battle of Hoengsong. PRC and North Korean forces massed in the central sector north of Hoengsong in order to renew another southward offensive. On the night of 11–12 February the enemy struck with five PRC People’s Liberation Army (PLA) armies and two North Korean corps, totaling approximately 135,000 soldiers. The main effort was against X Corps’ Republic of Korea (ROK) divisions north of Hoengsong. The PRC attack penetrated the ROK army lines and forced a withdrawal to the southeast via snow-covered passes in the rugged mountains. ROK units, particularly the 8th Division, were badly battered creating holes in the UN lines. Unable to stop the advancing PRC troops, UN forces began a general withdrawal to the south in the central area giving up territory only recently gained. (Staff Ride, 25)
Early in the morning of 12 February, the 23rd RCT Command Post received the following warning order:
From Div: 3d Bn 38th Inf being attacked from North & West. 21st ROK coming down to the South hit a roadblock and are in a mess. Don’t know results. They have wounded. 21st ROK is falling back 2000 yds. 23d ROK Regt also falling back thru 187 RCT. Higher HQ putting out the order to 9th Inf to be prepared on 3 hrs notice to assemble at YOJU. A similar order is given to the 38th Inf to assemble at WONJU. They might be two reason for this order, to support us or to establish blocking psn along line MUNMANG-NI to HUNGHO-RI. This is a warning order. (Staff Ride, p. 25)
In response to the warning order Col Freeman canceled all major patrols scheduled for the day and prepared to withdraw to the south. However, General Ridgway ordered that Chipyong-ni be held in order to block and delay PRC access to the Han River Valley. A PRC advance down the east bank of the Han threatened the positions of both IX and I Corps west of the river. Ridgway believed the 5,000 defenders of Chipyong-ni would quickly become the focus of PRC attention and if able to hold would allow X Corps to stabilize a defensive line at Wonju. (Staff Ride, p. 25)
Freeman dug in with the 23rd RCT. The 1st Battalion defended the northern arc of the perimeter, the 3rd the east, the 2nd the south, and the French battalion on the west. Company B and the Ranger Company were in reserve behind 1st Battalion’s line. Gaps in the perimeter were mined, blocked by barbed wire, or covered by fire. Twin 40s, quad 50s and regimental tanks were postioned to add direct firepower for defense, prearranged artillery and mortar concentrations ringed the perimeter out to the maximum range of the weapons, and a tactical air control party was ready to direct air strikes. (Staff Ride, p. 28)
On the morning of 13 February Colonel Freeman met with his subordinate commanders. The enemy was advancing with as many as five divisions but Freeman made their mission clear: hold your positions, do no count on reinforcements soon, and stand and fight it out – to the bitter end if needed. As Captain Bickford Sawyer, Easy Company’s commander, recalled, “When Colonel Freeman said at Chipyong, ‘We’re surrounded, but we’ll stay here and fight it out,’ we supported him with enthusiasm. There was never a doubt in our minds. We knew we were going to succeed.” (Staff Ride, p. 30)
And fight they did. For two nights and days the 23rd RCT stood their ground. Legends were made at Chipyong-ni. On the first night the French Battailon de Coree made a bayonet charge to push the enemy back. “E” and “G” companies used fougasse drums filled with gasoline and oil and detonated with grenades to spray attackers with a deadly mixture turning them into human candles. (Staff Ride, p. 32)
Amazingly, in the midst of the siege Ridgway himself visited the 23rd RCT on 14 February. His visited buoyed the spirits of the defenders. They needed the extra confidence because the worst was yet to come. (Staff Ride, p. 32)
The most trying period was the second night. As the regimental command report details:
Excerpt from 23d Infantry Regiment Command Report: The first enemy action of the evening occurred at 2030 hours, when “K” Company received a mortar barrage. At 2330 hours, “C” Company reported sounds of the enemy digging in to their front. The Regimental CO ordered conservation of all types of small arms ammunition as the supply was critically short in spite of the air drops. There was no reserve of 8-round clips for the M-1 rifles other than that in the company stocks at this time. Simultaneously with an attack from the South on the 2d Battalion area, the enemy brought the 23d CP under heavy Self-propelled Gun, Mortar and small arms fire. This continued for approximately an hour and the impact area spread out to include Mortar Company and the French Battalion trains area. Fighting increased around the perimeter until the 2d and 3d Battalions to the South and Southeast were engaged in fierce close combat. Bugles sounded on the hills to the North and 120mm heavy mortar rounds began to fall in the Regimental CP area. The fighting abated for a short period but at 0130 hours, the 15th of February “K” Company repulsed two (2) attacks, while pressure increased on the South and Southwest against “G” Company. (Staff Ride, p. 36)
The command report continues:
Excerpt from 23d Infantry Regiment Command Report: At 0230 hours, the enemy penetrated “I” Company positions but were driven out with the aid of “L” Company, after vicious, close-in-fighting. The overwhelming number of enemy forced the “G” Company line to withdraw at 0315 hours with heavy losses…. Ammunition stocks in the companies had become so low that commanders ordered their men not to fire unless they could actually see and hit the enemy. At this time, the supply trains contained less the 140 rounds of 4.2 mortar and 90 rounds of 81 mm mortar ammunition. (Staff Ride, p. 37)
The Battle of Chipyong-ni was not only a soldier’s battle but also had great close air support. As a soldier of the 23rd RCT recalled:
One major feeling at Chipyong-ni was the tremendous lift I got from the air force making napalm bombing and strafing runs on the surrounding hillsides. Apparently their method was to have the jets drop the napalm to flush the enemy and then the following plane would be a propeller driven unit for strafing. The jets would merely get a couple of very short bursts off during a run whereas the prop planes could fire nearly continuously and actually chase fleeing enemy. The tremendous lift in spirit mentioned above came when they were finished. They would make a very low-level “barrel-roll” run through the valley. The speed, the noise, the barrel-roll victory symbol all added to waving and indeed there was spontaneous cheering by us in the perimeter. (Staff Ride, p. 39)
Chipyong-ni was relieved on 15 February. UN casualties in the battle totaled 404, including 52 killed in action. PRC losses were far greater. The 23rd RCT estimated 4,946 enemy casualties; a number later confirmed by captured documents. In the course of the battle the 23rd RCT captured 79 PLA soldiers who at interrogation identified five different divisions from at least three PRC Armies. The attacking force, however, was likely about six regiments from at least five different divisions. The six PRC regiments did not coordinate their attacks nor did each appear to attack in full strength. (Staff Ride, p. 40)
As Ridgway told a joint session of Congress in May 1952:
I shall speak briefly of the Twenty-third United States Infantry Regiment, Colonel Paul L. Freeman commanding, with the French Battalion. Isolated far in advance of the general battle line, completely surrounded in near-zero weather, they repelled repeated assaults by day and night by vastly superior numbers of Chinese. They were finally relieved. I want to say that these American fighting men, with their French comrades-in-arms, measured up in every way to the battle conduct of the finest troops American and France have produced through their national existence. (“Battlefield Chronicles: The Battle of Chipyong-ni,” marines.togetherweserved.com)
The Battle of Chipyong-ni was the first tactical defeat of the communist forces at the hand of the UN. Following the Battle of Chipyong-ni General Ridgway felt Eighth Army had reached a turning point and regained confidence lost during the withdrawals of December and early January. The myth of communist invincibility was shattered—the era of “bugging out” ended. The successful defense of Chipyong-ni by an isolated RCT without major losses against a force far superior in strength symbolized that revitalization. With a renewed spirit, as evidenced at Chipyong-ni, Ridgway believed UN forces were now capable of further offensive actions. (Staff Ride, p. 41).
Chipyong-ni in Wargames
Although there are many more than a few wargames on the Korean War, the BoardGameGeek database list only a single game specifically on Chipyong-ni; The Siege of Chipyong-ni: A Wargame of the Korean War (designer Jiuyue Ati from Kuro Neko Design Workshop in Shanghai) was released in 2021.
Reference: THE BATTLE OF CHIPYONG-NI STAFF RIDE (KOREA, 1951) STUDY INSTRUCTIONS & READINGS (Combat Studies Institute, The Army University Press, Fort Leavenworth, Nov 2019). Accessible online at this PDF
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