Wednesday War Stories ~ The Battle of Khafji, 29 Jan–1 Feb 1991

Aaron Danis, 29 January 2025

The Battle for Khafji (al-Khafji) was the first ground combat of the Persian Gulf War between the Coalition and the Iraqi Army prior to the start of Operation Desert Storm. It demonstrated that the Iraqi Army was not all that the Western media made it out to be (i.e. decidedly NOT 10 feet tall). This week is the 34^th anniversary of the battle. Where does the time go?

The Battle for Khafji was fought in Saudi Arabia along the Arabian Gulf coast just south of the Kuwait border over 3 days in January 1991. Although it was not a large battle when compared to the U.S. VII Corps fights with the Iraqi Republican Guard a few weeks later, it demonstrated the Iraqi Army’s vulnerability to airpower (and the force-multiplying effect of U.S. forward air controllers), and that the Saudi and Qatari troops were ready to fight against Saddam Hussein’s forces. Because it is often a minor chapter in larger works on Operation Desert Storm and only involved a few U.S. ground forces, there are not a lot of options to wargame this battle (actually, one).

As the start of the Operations Desert Storm air campaign approached, the Saudi government evacuated the 15,000 residents of al-Khafji, a port city. It was turned into an observation post, home to a couple of small detachments of U.S. Marines and Navy SEALS and a few Saudi Marines and Coast Guardsmen along the road north to the Kuwaiti border. There was no Coalition intent to fight here because it had little intrinsic value. As it turned out, Saddam Hussein had other plans.¹

click most images to enlarge

 

On 29 January, Iraq launched a multi-division operation into Saudi Arabia to seize al-Khafji, disrupt Coalition plans, and score a propaganda victory. Saddam had a personal hand in planning the attack, choosing it from one of three courses of action. The main attack was towards al-Khafji using the Regular Army’s III Corps’ 5^th Mechanized Division. Its 3^rd Armored Division and the IV Corp’s 1^st Mechanized Division were ordered to conduct a supporting attack around the so-called “heel” of Kuwait. These units were equipped mostly with obsolete Soviet-made T-54/55 and T-62 tanks, BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicles (IFV), and a mix of Soviet and Western artillery pieces. Somewhat prophetically, the plan did show concern for the threat of Coalition airpower.

 

Once the 5^th Mech Division captured al-Khafji, the 1^st Mech and 3d Armored Divisions would withdraw back into Kuwait. According to the plan, after the Coalition ground response was triggered, the 5^th Mech Division would withdraw from al-Khafji back to the defensive lines on Saudi-Kuwait border. The attack was to be launched at 2000 on 29 January and al-Khafji was to be occupied within 5 hours.² According to a senior Iraqi general, the objective was simple:

…It is better that we attack the enemy while we still have our capability [it will be] better than fighting him while we are bending down…[There were] several targets, and several plans [but] the main purpose behind them was to drag the enemy into engagements with ground formations in the most expeditious manner or the fastest way possible…the aim was to destroy oil facilities, destroy them and then return to the main launching area…the main aim was to wage a raid.³

In essence, the Iraqi attack on Al-Khafji was a gamble designed to lure Coalition forces into ground engagement while the Iraqi Army could still maneuver their mechanized forces and deal the Coalition (particularly the Saudis and the Gulf allies) a defeat.⁴

In between the border and the town was a series of U.S. observation posts placed at 10–20 kilometer intervals and manned by U.S. Navy SEALs, Army Special Forces, and Marine recon teams in order to gather intelligence on Iraqi forces in Kuwait (see the numbered black triangles in Figure 1 above). Posts 7 & 8, closest to the coast, also had U.S. air-naval gunfire supporting arms liaison (ANGLICO) teams present. Joint Forces Command-East, under Saudi command, was further divided into task forces. Abu Bakr Task Force, comprised of the 2d Saudi Arabian National Guard Brigade and an attached Qatari armored battalion, was responsible for al-Khafji and the surrounding desert. The 2d Saudi Arabian National Guard Brigade’s 5^th Battalion established a screen north of al-Khafji and west of the coastal highway, behind Observation Post 7. Tariq Task Force, comprised of the nascent Saudi Arabian Marines as well as a battalion of Moroccan infantry, was along the coast south of al-Khafji. The Qataris were equipped with French-made AMX-30 tanks and AMX-10 IFV, and the Saudis had U.S.-made M-60 tanks, V-150 light armored vehicles, and M113 APCs. The US Marines had various versions of the LAV-25 light armored vehicle.⁵

 

When the attack began, it caught the Coalition by surprise and the Iraqis quickly doverd the approximately 50 kilometers from the border and grabbed the undefended Al-Khafji by 0200 hours. U.S. observation posts managed to mostly avoid the onrushing forces and called in artillery and eventually air support. Further west hear the “heel,” the Marines lost 2 LAVs to friendly fire at OP4, resulting in most of the Marines killed in the battle. However, the Iraqi 6^th Armored Brigade of the 3^rd Armored Division was destroyed, and the entire Iraqi force took heavy material losses. A U.S. C-130 gunship also was shot down, killing all aboard.⁶

 

The next day the anxious Saudi commander ordered a counterattack by Saudi and Qatari forces with Coalition air support (directed by ANGLICOs) to retake the town, which was done successfully against determined Iraqi resistance by 1 February. The border was restored in short order. In the Battle of al-Khafji, 25 Americans lost their lives (11 Marines and 14 airmen). Three Marines were wounded and two soldiers captured by the enemy. Two LAVs and one AC-130 gunship were destroyed. The Saudis and Qataris suffered 18 killed and 50 wounded, and lost 10 armored cars and 2 tanks destroyed. The Iraqis lost, in addition to the 6^th Armored Brigade, nearly the entire 5^th Mech Division, with hundreds killed, wounded, and captured, and up to a hundred vehicles destroyed, mostly from Coalition airpower.⁷ While Saddam could claim a small propaganda victory for taking and holding Saudi soil for a few days, the Saudis and Qataris could claim proudly that they defeated the Iraqi Army, and this provided the other Coalition members with confidence in their Gulf allies. It also was a harbinger of what was to come, as airpower paralyzed the Iraqi Army and ground forces steamrolled it in the coming days.

 

Want to game it out?

There’s really only one option and it’s at the tactical (largely platoon) level. It is the “Saddam Strikes Back” scenario from GDW The Sands of War (it also has an expansion kit which is not necessary for the Khafji scenario). To be more precise, the scenario should have been titled “Saddam Strikes First,” and it pits Qatari and Saudi forces (with help from U.S. Marine Corps forward observers in the town) against the Iraqi Army as they try to retake Al-Khafji. It uses 2 of the geomorphic maps, and map 10 is only used for this scenario. If you want a copy of Sands of War it is available on the secondary market for $30-50.

I once owned this game, but I was past tanks being “disrupted.” I had been spoiled forever by SPI’s October War, with its more emotionally satisfying and realistic individual vehicle losses. So, I sold this a few years ago and never looked back. Beyond this game, there are 4 or so operational-level Operation Desert Storm games, but Khafji is just one of many towns on those maps and doesn’t rate its own scenario.

 

 

Other Resources

There are several quality videos available on YouTube. Here is a sampling:

• Battle of Khafji 1991 (6:28) – Short and to the point!
• The Battle of Khafji, 1st Gulf War, 1991 (7:28) – A CBS news report.
• Battle of Khafji – Gulf War (23:06) – More from the USAF point of view.
• Battle of Khafji-Gulf War (Documentary) (49:26) A longer documentary with more detail.

There are plenty of online resources for learning more about the Battle of Khafji, but these are compact and come from official sources.

• Paul W. Westermeyer, U.S. Marines in Battle, Al-Khafji, 28 January – 1 February 1991, History Division, United States Marine Corps, Quantico, VA, 2014. Note: This is your #1 resource, extracted from a longer USMC study of its role in liberating Kuwait.
• William P. Head, “The Battle for Ra’s Al-Khafji and the Effects of Air Power, January 29-February 1,1991, Parts I & II,” Air Power History, Spring & Summer 2013. Note: This beats reading the entire USAF report.
• Kevin M. Woods, Iraqi Perspectives Project Phase II, Um Al-Ma’arik (The Mother of All Battles): Operational and Strategic Insights from an Iraqi Perspective, Volume 1 (Revised May 2008), Institute for Defense Analyses, May 2008. Note: This uses captured Iraqi documents to give the reader the view of the war from the Iraqi perspective. It is pure gold.
• Aaron Danis, “A Military Analysis of Iraqi Army Operations,” Armor Bulletin, November-December 1990, pp. 13-18. Note: This was the author’s unclassified contribution to U.S. forces preparing to fight in Iraq. I was told 30,000 copies were shipped to the Gulf.

 

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1. Woods, Iraqi Perspectives Project Phase II, p. 25
2. Westermeyer, U.S. Marines in Battle, Al-Khafji, p.5.
3. Woods, Iraqi Perspectives Project Phase II, pp. 27-28.
4. Head, “The Battle for Ra’s Al-Khafji,” p.12.
5. Westermeyer, U.S. Marines in Battle, Al-Khafji, pp. 8-10.
6. Westermeyer, U.S. Marines in Battle, Al-Khafji, pp. 20-21.
7. Head, “The Battle for Ra’s Al-Khafji,” p.30.